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Contrary to the usual assumption of fixed, well-defined and context independent
preferences, individuals are likely to approach a choice task using rules and heuristics
that are dependent on the choice environment. More specifically, heuristics that are
defined by the local choice context, such as the gains or losses of an attribute value
relative to the other attributes, seem to matter significantly. Recent empirical findings
also demonstrate that previous choices made by respondents and previous choice tasks
shown to respondents can affect the current choice outcome, indicating a form of inter-
dependence across choice sets.
This paper reviews some of the key findings about heuristics and decision rules across
the psychology, marketing, transport and environmental disciplines. Using experimental
data in the context of a proposed toll road, we find that for certain components of the time
and cost attributes, allowing for non-linearity and for referencing to the least desired
attribute level in the local choice set offers improvement over the standard linear-in-the-
attributes and linear-in-the-parameters specification. Other heuristics, including the
majority of confirming dimensions and reference point revision can also be embedded
into the model. An alternative approach to identifying and weighting multiple heuristics
in a utility function by means of a logit-type specification for the weights is then
introduced. While acknowledging the need for more work in this area, we suggest that
such an approach may be a useful way of testing what happens when multiple heuristics
are “mixed” in the model.
& 2013 Elsevier Ltd.Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
The typical approach used in much of the discrete choice modelling literature assumes that well-defined preferences
exist for most decision tasks. Under the standard random utility theory, preferences are stable and invariant to choice tasks
and are fully known to the respondent. In the great majority of cases, the analyst models a cognitively indefatigable agent
who examines all alternatives and all attributes across all choice tasks in the same fully compensatory manner. The linear
weighted additive form for utility, estimated by means of the multinomial logit model, has been found to be a convenient
representation which is capable of embodying all these assumptions and has therefore become the mainstay in discrete
choice modelling.+61 2 91141722.
W. Leong), david.hensher@sydney.edu.au (D.A. Hensher).
Y-NC-ND license.
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experiment literature, has cast considerable doubt that the weighted additive function, assumed independent of contextual
effects, comes close to being an adequate representation of the actual processes used in the majority of decision tasks.
Empirical research from the psychology literature has shown that preferences for an alternative are influenced by the choice
context itself, in other words, by factors that are beyond the immediate attributes of the alternative under consideration.
Choice task properties such as the number of alternatives and attributes impact decisions in terms of how decision rules are
selected and applied (Payne et al., 1993). Decisions may also be made according to some reference point selected by the
respondent. This reference may have something to do with the other alternatives in the same choice set or even across
previously encountered choice sets (Simonson and Tversky, 1992; Kivetz et al., 2004). Moreover, different respondents may
be attending to various subsets of attributes, and such heterogeneity may be masked if it is assumed that preference weights
are the same across the entire dataset. What these findings suggest is that compared to the context independent, linear
weighted additive form of utility, which has no doubt been a very useful analytical tool, other representations of utility
which better approximate the realism of real-life decision making can lead to better goodness of fit and more plausible
model estimates and outputs.
In line with this broad thrust, the purpose of this paper is to review some of the important findings about decision
processes and the theoretical models that have emerged from the literature, before testing a subset of these heuristics in an
empirical stated choice context, using a non-linear logit form in a functional specification and in a setting which allows
multiple heuristics to be weighted. The paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews some of the heuristics that
have been identified the transport, marketing, environmental and psychology literatures. Section 3 describes the dataset
which will be used for the empirical analysis of multiple heuristics, detailed in Section 4. The final section concludes with
suggestions for further research.2. Heuristics in choice modelling
The psychology literature has amassed a wealth of evidence to suggest that humans rely on the use of quick mental
processing rules known as decision heuristics to manage the vast number of decisions that must be made in everyday life.
Notwithstanding the simplicity of the weighted additive rule for the purposes of modelling, it is recognised that this rule, if
followed strictly to the letter, is cognitively demanding and time consuming (Payne et al., 1993). Heuristics are therefore
needed to balance the tradeoff between making accurate decisions (as summarised by the weighted additive rule) and
minimising cognitive effort. Early work in this field frequently discussed heuristics such as lexicography (Tversky, 1969),
elimination-by-aspects (Tversky, 1972) and the majority of confirming dimensions (Russo and Dosher, 1983).2 Some authors
like Bettman et al. (1998) have attempted to make sense of how people use these heuristics by relating them to choice task
properties (number of alternatives, number of attributes, inter-attribute correlation, etc.) in a ‘choice goals framework’.
Over the years, the discrete choice literature has made a number of advances in terms of modelling selected aspects of
these ‘classic’ decision rules. Reminiscent of the elimination-by-aspects heuristic, some authors have modelled decisions as
following a two stage process, with the first stage typically involving a screening rule to narrow a universal set of
alternatives into a consideration set before choice is made in the second stage (Cantillo and Ortuzar, 2005; Swait, 2009).
The elimination-by-aspects heuristic may also be directly modelled by obtaining information from respondents on their
attribute cut-off levels (Swait, 2001), or by testing various implicit rules in a latent class structure (Hess et al., 2012).
Lexicographic choice was studied by Saelesminde (2006) and also modelled by Hess et al. (2012), while Hensher and Collins
(2011) looked at modelling the majority of confirming dimensions.
Another broad category of heuristics, which we will primarily focus on in this paper, might be called ‘relational’
heuristics. By ‘relational’, these heuristics emphasise the comparison of ratings of one alternative against another, allowing
the value obtained from an alternative to also depend on the local choice context. The random regret minimisation (RRM)
model first suggested by Chorus et al. (2008) with subsequent enhancements in Chorus (2010) falls into this category (see
also Hess et al. (2012) for a case study using the RRM). In the RRM model, respondents seek to minimise the regret which
occurs when the attributes of the considered alternative perform poorly relative to the attributes of the other alternatives
in the choice set. Chorus (2010) shows that the RRM model is able to explain the fairly robust empirical findings of the
so-called ‘compromise effect’, which leads respondents to prefer an in-between alternative when extreme alternatives are
available in the choice set. Extreme alternatives are those which perform best on some attributes, but worst on others.
Loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) has been offered as one explanation for the compromise effect. Because the
disadvantages of an alternative (defined relative to the other alternatives in the choice set) loom larger than its advantages,
the in-between alternative is favoured with its smaller advantages and disadvantages, compared to the larger advantages
and disadvantages involved in choosing the extreme alternatives (Tversky and Simonson, 1993). More recently, Louviere and
Meyer (2008) argue that this effect can also arise from preference uncertainty among risk averse individuals.
Among the models of the compromise effect proposed in the marketing literature by Kivetz et al. (2004), we will
consider their contextual concavity model, which takes the attribute value with the lowest part-utility as the reference point2 The majority of confirming dimensions heuristic prompts respondents to choose the alternative with the highest number of winning (best) attribute
levels.
Table 2.1
A worked example for the contextual concavity model.
Alt 1 Alt 2 Alt 3
Attribute 1
Assumed value for vj1ðXj1Þ 5.4 12.0 20.3
vj1ðXj1Þ−vr1ðXr1Þ, where vr1ðXr1Þ ¼ 5:4 0 6.6 14.9
ðvj1ðXj1Þ−vr1ðXr1ÞÞ0:5, assuming c1¼0.5 0 2.6 3.9
Attribute 2
Assumed value for vj2ðXj2Þ 30.3 23.7 15.4
vj2ðXj2Þ−vr2ðXr2Þ, where vr2ðXr2Þ ¼ 15:4 14.9 8.3 0
ðvj2ðXj2Þ−vr2ðXr2ÞÞ0:3, assuming c2¼0.3 2.2 1.9 0
Vj ¼ ðvj1ðXj1Þ−vr1ðXr1ÞÞ0:5 þ ðvj2ðXj2Þ−vr2ðXr2ÞÞ0:3 2.2 4.5 3.9
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of utility is shown in Eq. (2.1).
Vj ¼∑
k
ðvjkðXjkÞ−vrkðXrkÞÞck ð2:1Þ
Under prospect theory, as gains are assumed to be concave relative to the reference, ck is introduced as a concavity
parameter for attribute k. Xrk in this case is the attribute value that gives the lowest utility on attribute k across all
alternatives in the local choice set. Using some assumed values for the part-utilities, Table 2.1 illustrates how the contextual
concavity model leads to an increased relative preference for the intermediate alternative (Alt 2). As a consequence of
concavity, which implies diminishing marginal sensitivity to gains, the in-between alternative with its moderate gains on
the attributes provides a higher utility level, compared to the extreme alternatives. On the other hand, in a linear
specification for the utility function, all three alternatives yield the same value for Vj.
Besides the compromise effect, the polarisation effect has also been demonstrated in several cases (Simonson and
Tversky, 1992; Tversky and Simonson, 1993). Both the compromise and the polarisation effects may be viewed as behavi-
oural manifestations of the extremeness aversion heuristic. The compromise effect is a symmetric form of extremeness
aversion, occurring when disadvantages loom larger than advantages on all attributes. The in-between alternative becomes
the compromise, and its share is enhanced relative to both extreme alternatives, as in the worked example of Table 2.1.
Polarisation occurs when the introduction of an in-between alternative substantially reduces the relative share of one of the
extreme alternatives but makes the other extreme alternative even more favoured. This happens when disadvantages loom
larger than advantages on only some of the attributes of the alternatives, but not on others.
The opposite of extremeness aversion may also be true. Gourville and Soman (2007) document cases of extremeness
seeking when choice sets are ‘non-alignable’. A non-alignable choice set entails alternatives “that vary along discrete, non-
compensatory attributes, such that one alternative may possess one set of desirable features, while a second alternative may
possess a different set of desirable features” (Gourville and Soman, 2007, p. 10). An example of a non-alignable choice set is
the choice among multiple car models, with say one alternative having a high quality car stereo with rear seat DVD
entertainment (but no sun roof), and another alternative having the sun roof, but no rear seat entertainment. Hence, the
trade-off across attributes is discrete, such that by choosing one alternative, the desirable features of another have to be
given up completely. In cases of non-alignable choices, Gourville and Soman found that respondents displayed an increased
tendency to either of the extreme alternatives (i.e., a low price, basic model or a high-price, fully loaded model) when the
size of the choice set is increased. The heuristic posited to undergird this behaviour is an all-or-nothing strategy, i.e.,
choosing the basic low-priced alternative or the high-priced, fully loaded alternative, rather than something in between.
Gourville and Soman do not outright reject extremeness aversion, but qualify that extremeness aversion occurs when the
attributes are alignable, i.e., when attributes can be traded off incrementally. For example, a choice involving a low-priced,
low processing speed computer model and a medium-priced, medium processing speed model is alignable and the
introduction of an extreme high priced, high processing speed option causes the relative market share of the intermediate
option to go up. Gourville and Soman suggest that more needs to be done to investigate the impact of hybrid alignable/non-
alignable attributes in the choice set, which arguably characterises most real-world decision making.
Besides allowing for context dependence in the local choice set to influence choices, the notion of ‘relational’ can be
extended to allow preceding choice tasks or choice outcomes to impact current choice. As noted by Simonson and Tversky
(1992), “in deciding whether or not to select a particular option, people commonly compare it to other alternatives that are
currently available as well as with relevant alternatives that have been encountered in the past” (Simonson and Tversky,
1992, p. 282). Since most choice experiments require respondents to answer a series of choice tasks, the Simonson and
Tversky assertion implies that preferences over attributes are not necessarily independent across choice tasks.
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current decision making context (Bateman et al., 2008; Day and Prades, 2010). Of these ordering effects, strategic
misrepresentation is a particular concern in the environmental literature, as is value learning (Scheufele and Bennett,
2010; McNair et al., 2011, 2012). In strategic misrepresentation, respondents are assumed to withhold truthful revelation of
their preferences for the current hypothetical alternative and stick with the status quo if a previously chosen hypothetical
alternative was better compared to those on offer in the current choice set. This withholding of the truth may be allowed to
occur up to a probability. In value learning, respondents choose based on the current attribute levels relative to the past; for
example, an alternative is more likely to be chosen if its current price is low compared to levels experienced in previous
choice tasks. Related to strategic misrepresentation and value learning is the notion of reference point revision, which
DeShazo (2002) argues is used by respondents to frame the desirability of follow-up options relative to some previously
chosen alternative. This previously chosen alternative happens to become the new reference point. In a direct test of how
reference points are shifted when non status quo alternatives are chosen, Hensher and Collins (2011) found that if a non-
reference (i.e., non-status quo) alternative is chosen in the preceding choice set s−1, the reference in the current choice set s
is revised and the utility of the non-status quo alternatives increases. This suggests a shift in the value function around the
new reference point.
In the remainder of the paper, we proceed to test the following three heuristics in the context of a transport dataset:
(i) extremeness aversion; (ii) the majority of confirming dimensions and (iii) reference revision.3. Empirical application
The dataset used in this paper is obtained from a stated choice study undertaken in 2008 on a proposed toll road in
Australia. The experimental design consisted of 32 choice situations, with each of the 752 respondents given a block of 16
choice situations. Each choice situation consisted of the current trip as well as two unlabelled hypothetical experimental
alternatives, with the levels of each attribute of the hypothetical alternatives pivoted around the level of the corresponding
attribute in the current trip. The exception is the toll cost attribute. As most respondents reported not having to pay a toll in
their current trip, the levels of the toll cost attribute are fixed over a range from no toll to $4.20, with the upper limit
determined by the trip length of the respondent's reported trip. Fig. 3.1 illustrates the choice task presented to the
respondents. The experiment was designed according to the D-efficiency criterion, which increases the statistical efficiency
of the model for a given sample size, compared to less statistically efficient methods such as orthogonal designs (Rose and
Bliemer, 2008).
As this paper is an exploratory analysis into the role of heuristics in choice experiments, we will focus only on the time
components of the trip—viz., time in free flow traffic (FF), time slowed down by other traffic (SDT) and time in stop/start/
crawling conditions (SST) and the cost components—running costs (RC) and toll costs (TC), in model estimation. Doing so
does not mean that we are unaware of the potential for model misspecification in ignoring the attributes associated with the
probability of early, on-time and late arrivals. Indeed, there is a growing literature on how respondents handle risk and
uncertainty in choice experiments (see for example, Hensher et al. (2013)) and future work in this area may bring theseFig. 3.1. Screen capture of illustrative choice task.
Table 3.1
Descriptive statistics of selected socioeconomic characteristics.
Statistic Mean Standard deviation
Gender (female¼1) 0.565 0.496
Income ($) 46,640 31,887
Age (years) 42.70 14.96
Table 3.2
Descriptive statistics for modelled attributes.
Attribute Mean Standard deviation
Free flow time (min) 17.86 18.15
Slowed down time (min) 12.61 10.67
Stop start time (min) 12.31 13.52
Running costs ($) 4.37 7.20
Toll costs ($) 1.42 1.51
Table 3.3
Incidence of apparent lexicography in the dataset.
Attribute Number of respondents choosing ‘lexicographically’
Free flow time 30 (4.0%)
Slowed down time 59 (7.8%)
Stop start time 80 (10.6%)
Running costs 0 (0.0%)
Toll costs 281 (37.4%)
Note: Total number of respondents¼752.
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while the attributes of the choice tasks are summarised in Table 3.2.
For this dataset, it is also useful to describe the incidence of apparent lexicographic behaviour, as shown in Table 3.3.
In this context, apparent lexicographic behaviour is defined as always choosing, in all 16 choice sets, that alternative
possessing the minimum level of a particular attribute, for example, always choosing the alternative with the lowest free
flow time.3 This minimum level may or may not be unique among the three alternatives.
We observe that a significant portion of respondents is always choosing the alternative with the lowest toll costs,
indicating that these respondents are either highly sensitive to toll costs (but still trading off on the other attributes of the
alternative), or that the lexicographic rule, with a high importance weight placed on the toll cost attribute, is being used to
make decisions. Intuitively, this would not be surprising considering that 740 out of 752 respondents reported not having to
pay a toll for their current trip.
The empirical analysis that follows in Section 4 uses the full dataset of respondents, including lexicographic individuals.
Models that exclude lexicographic respondents are not presented as the heuristics tested are found to enter the utility
function in qualitatively similar ways.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Referencing relative to the worst attribute level in choice set
We first derive empirical estimates for the multinomial logit (MNL) model, with the modelled component of utility
specified to be linear in the parameters and linear in the attributes (LPLA). Parameter estimates are generic across
alternatives. Included in the estimation is a socioeconomic variable for the respondent's age and an interaction term for
income and cost, where cost is defined to be the sum of RC and TC. Results are shown in Table 4.1.
Relaxing the LPLA assumption, but otherwise maintaining the assumptions of the MNL model, the first heuristic we test
arises from one of Kivetz et al.'s (2004) specification for the extremeness aversion heuristic. The modelling approach
adopted here uses the contextual concavity specification of Eq. (2.1), where the context dependence stems from the part-3 Such behaviour is best described as apparent lexicographic behaviour as it is uncertain if this kind of behaviour is a result of full lexicographic
preferences or of extreme preferences.
Table 4.1
Results from standard MNL estimation.
LPLA model β^ (s.e.)
Model 1
Free flow time (FF) (min) −0.0408nnn (0.0032)
Slowed down time (SDT) (min) −0.0689nnn (0.0041)
Stop start time (SST) (min) −0.0731nnn (0.0036)
Running Cost (RC) ($) −0.2495nnn (0.0192)
Toll Cost (TC) ($) −0.3867nnn (0.0177)
Age (years) 0.0061nnn (0.0018)
Income cost ($ ’000s) 0.0011nnn (0.00024)
Constant
–current alternative 0.5316nnn (0.0820)
–Route A −0.4000nnn (0.0820)
No. of observations 12,032
Log-likelihood −9147.59
Information criterion: normalised AIC 1.522
Pseudo-R2 (relative to constants-only model) 0.0790
Adj pseudo-R2 0.0784
Standard errors in parentheses.
nnn Significance at the one per cent level.
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attribute in that choice set. For this dataset, Eq. (4.1) expresses the utility for alternative j in each choice set
Uj ¼ β0;j þ ðβ1FFmax−β1FFjÞφ1 þ ðβ2SDTmax−β2SDTjÞφ2 þ ðβ3SSTmax−β3SSTjÞφ3
þðβ4RCmax−β4RCjÞφ4 þ ðβ5TCmax−β5TCjÞφ5 þ βageageþ βincomecost income costþ εj
β0;j ¼ βage ¼ 0 if j¼ Route B ð4:1Þ
With the exception of the alternative specific constants, all other parameters are generic across alternatives. If the notion
of diminishing returns to the gains in part utilities in the contextual concavity model is valid, the prior expectation is for φk
to satisfy the inequality 0oφko1. From the econometric perspective however, it is not necessary for such a constraint to be
imposed on φk, hence we allow φk to be freely estimated. Moreover, written in the form above where the reference (i.e.,
‘worst’) attribute level, defined as the maximum of each of the time and cost components in the choice set, precedes the
minus sign, the prior expectation is for β^k to be positive, in order for Uj to be increasing in the gains in part utilities. Table 4.2
reports the results of this non-linear logit estimation.
The results obtained from Model 2 show that all the φ^s and β^s are statistically significant at the one per cent level,
with the β^s possessing the correct signs. Relative to the LPLA MNL model, results from the likelihood ratio test suggest
that embedding a contextual heuristic into the model provides a better statistical fit at the one per cent level [Model 2 vs.
Model 1: Prob ðχ2ð5Þ4171:04Þo0:01].
Concavity of the power parameter can be tested by comparing the null H0 : φ^¼ 1 (no concavity, i.e., linear in the
attributes) against the alternative H1 : φ^o1 (concavity). The null cannot be rejected at the five per cent level for φ^FF and
φ^SST . We conclude that in the FF and SST time components, respondents are behaving as if they are linear utility maximisers.
On the other hand, the data allow us to reject the null hypotheses φ^RC ¼ 1 and φ^TC ¼ 1, in favour of the alternative
hypotheses φ^RCo1 and φ^TCo1, at the five per cent significance level. This finding is consistent with a concavity power
parameter. With all else equal, respondents are extremeness averse when evaluating the cost attributes. A more interesting
result relates to the rejection of the null hypothesis φ^SDT ¼ 1 in favour of the alternative hypothesis φ^SDT41, leading us to the
conclusion that respondents are treating utility gains in SDT as a convex function, rather than a concave function. Instead of
an extremeness aversion heuristic, we now have empirical evidence of an extremeness seeking heuristic being used to
evaluate the SDT component. However, full extremeness seeking in the sense of Gourville and Soman (2007) requires all the
power parameters to be greater than one. When extremeness aversion is exhibited only in a subset of attributes and not in
all attributes of the alternatives, it may be concluded that respondents in this choice context are exhibiting the polarisation
effect.
To summarise, the estimation results from Model 2 show that accounting for some form of referencing and accounting
for non-linearity in the utility function are important. We leave open for future work the question of whether extremeness
aversion and extremeness seeking are pervasive in other contexts, but in view of the evidence that we have, instead of what
has hitherto been known as a contextual concavity model, which makes the prior assumption that utility is concave in the
gains, it may be more useful to label such a functional specification as a ‘non-linear worst level referencing’ (NLWLR) model.
Whether the utility function is concave or convex in the gains might be best left as an empirical exercise.
Table 4.2
Results from a non-linear multinomial logit model.
Model 2
β^ (s.e.) φ^ (s.e.)
Free flow time (FF) (min) 0.0419nnn (0.0027) 1.0213nnn (0.0692)
Slowed down time (SDT) (min) 0.0739nnn (0.0031) 1.2850nnn (0.0729)
Stop start time (SST) (min) 0.0733nnn (0.0031) 1.0917nnn (0.0540)
Running cost (RC) ($) 0.3651nnn (0.0338) 0.5971nnn (0.0337)
Toll cost (TC) ($) 0.4027nnn (0.0231) 0.8343nnn (0.0576)
Constant
–Current alternative 0.4931nnn (0.0838)
–Route A −0.3377nnn (0.0840)
Age (years) 0.0061nnn (0.0018)
Income cost ($ ’000s) 0.0011nnn (0.0002)
No. of observations 12,032
Log-likelihood −9062.07
Information criterion: normalised AIC 1.509
Pseudo-R2 (relative to constants-only model) 0.0877
Adj pseudo-R2 0.0866
Standard errors in parentheses.
nnn Significance at the one per cent level.
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Testing for the MCD heuristic involves, according to Hensher and Collins (2011), generating a total count of the number of
attributes in each alternative j that have the best levels across all alternatives in choice set s. This generated variable is
labelled mcd. To contribute to the count, the attribute has to have an attribute level strictly better than all the levels of the
same attribute in the other alternatives. Because of this requirement, when added up overall alternatives in the choice set,
the levels of the mcd variable does not necessarily sum to five, which is the number of modelled attributes. Table 4.3
illustrates the frequency distribution of the mcd variable in the dataset.
An interesting question arises as to whether the generated mcd variable should enter into the utility expressions of all
three alternatives, or only into the utility of just the hypothetical ones. Arguments can be made for either case. In the former,
it may be assumed that the respondent chooses to consistently apply a particular heuristic across all alternatives in the
choice set. Such a hypothesis would be in line with the choice goals framework described in Section 2, where it was
mentioned that the choice environment itself influences the use of heuristics. In support of the latter hypothesis, we observe
that in pivot designs, where the attribute levels of the current alternative are fixed throughout the experiment, even as the
attribute levels of the hypothetical alternatives are varying from choice task to choice task, using a simplifying heuristic like
MCD to assess the hypothetical alternatives would be cognitively easier on the respondent. At the same time, the cognitive
burden of evaluating the current alternative using the weighted linear additive function in a fully compensatory sense is not
very onerous: once the respondent calculates the value for the current alternative in the first choice set (or refers to a stored
value in memory), it remains constant throughout.
On the basis of modelling fit, we observe that the mcd variable, modelled with a generic parameter across all three
alternatives revealed a downward bias compared to modelling a generic mcd parameter for only the hypothetical
alternatives, and an alternative specific mcd parameter for the current alternative, which turns out to be statistically
insignificant at the five per cent level. Estimation results testing both specifications are presented in Table 4.4. Under the
particular assumptions of the MNL model therefore, inclusion of the mcd variable was restricted to just the hypothetical
alternatives. Results of this latter estimation are shown in Table 4.5.
The inclusion of the MCD heuristic leads to a statistical improvement in the log-likelihood values of both the LPLA and
NLWLR models. The estimated parameter of the mcd variable is positive and statistically significant, which concurs with the
finding in Hensher and Collins (2011). As Hensher and Collins (2011) analyse a different dataset (a proposed toll road in
New Zealand), this result gives us an added measure of confidence about the robustness of the MCD heuristic across
datasets. In terms of the parameter estimates, the key change from Model 2 to Model 4 lies in the power parameter for the
SST variable. After accounting for the MCD heuristic, it can be seen that φ^SST is now statistically greater than one, suggesting
convexity in the utility gains for SST and more generally, extremeness seeking in the time components.
4.3. The reference point revision heuristic
In the context of stated choice experiments, the reference point revision heuristic may be applied to the current choice
task when a non-status quo alternative was chosen previously (Hensher and Collins, 2011). Essentially, this hypothesis
states that the respondents' utility for an experimentally constructed alternative shifts (upwards) whenever a hypothetical
Table 4.3
Frequency distribution of the mcd variable.
Value of ∑j∈smcdj Frequency of choice sets
1 2 (0.02%)
2 180 (1.50%)
3 1492 (12.4%)
4 4805 (39.94%)
5 5553 (46.15%)
Total 12,032 (100%)
Table 4.4
Comparison of mcd parameter assumptions.
LPLA model LPLA model
Generic mcd parameter
overall alternatives
Generic mcd parameter over hypothetical alternatives;
alternative specific mcd parameter for current alternative
β^ (s.e.) β^ (s.e.)
Free flow time (FF) (min) −0.0332nnn (0.0033) −0.0277nnn (0.0033)
Slowed down time (SDT) (min) −0.0551nnn (0.0045) −0.0538nnn (0.0045)
Stop start time (SST) (min) −0.0623nnn (0.0038) −0.0569nnn (0.0039)
Running cost (RC) ($) −0.2060nnn (0.0196) −0.1794nnn (0.0195)
Toll cost (TC) ($) −0.3682nnn (0.0177) −0.3792nnn (0.0179)
mcdcurr¼mcdRoute A¼mcdRoute B 0.1128nnn (0.0154) –
mcdcurr – −0.0433n (0.0230)
mcdRoute A¼mcdRoute B – 0.3026nnn (0.0261)
Constant
–Current alternative 0.4906nnn (0.0823) 1.0346nnn (0.1026)
–Route A −0.3070nnn (0.0821) −0.3208nnn (0.0825)
Age (years) 0.0059nnn (0.0018) 0.0061nnn (0.0018)
Incomen cost ($ ’000s) 0.0010nnn (0.0002) 0.0010nnn (0.0002)
Log-likelihood −9120.80 −9079.85
Information criterion: normalised AIC 1.518 1.511
No. of observations 12,032 12,032
Pseudo-R2 (relative to constants-only model) 0.0817 0.0859
Adj pseudo-R2 0.0810 0.0850
Standard errors in parentheses.
n Significance at the ten per cent level.
nnn Significance at the one per cent level.
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concept of value learning. In the latter, underlying preferences in the form of the taste parameters may initially be poorly
formed or unknown to the respondent and are discovered as respondents work through the sequence of choice tasks.
For example, McNair et al. (2011) show that preferences are sensitive to the sequence and attribute levels shown to
respondents. In reference revision, the taste parameters are assumed to be stable but preferences can be affected by
previous choices. Reference revision can also be interpreted from the perspective of the well documented status quo bias
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). Here, the respondent's preceding choice works as a ‘local’ status quo in exerting an
influence on the current choice task. Econometrically, the specification used to model reference point revision is a more
explicit and appropriate way of treating choice set interdependence, compared to using a correlated error variance structure
(Hensher and Collins, 2011).
Specifically, a dummy variable (refrev) was created that equals one whenever a hypothetical experimental alternative
(i.e., Route A or Route B) was chosen in the previous choice set. This dummy variable was then inserted into the Route A/
Route B utility functions of the current choice set. refrev was set to zero for the first choice set encountered by the
respondent. As with themcd variable, refrevwas specified as entering the utility function in a linear additive manner. Results
of this estimation are shown in Table 4.6.
Statistically, the log-likelihood values of Models 5 and 6 show a remarkable improvement over Models 3 and 4 when just
one additional variable, refrev, is included, with the NLWLR model fitting the data better than LPLA. The refrev parameter is
found to be positive and statistically significant, which again replicates the conclusion in Hensher and Collins (2011). With
these results, we are now beginning to amass a greater wealth of evidence that the reference revision heuristic and the MCD
heuristic are important elements of decision making that should be explicitly included in future choice models. However, it
would also be important to point out that the reference revision effect is modified to a very large extent when an error
components model is used, as will be elaborated in Section 4.5.
Table 4.5
Estimation results including the MCD heuristic.
LPLA model NLWLR model
Model 3 Model 4
β^ (s.e.) β^ (s.e.) φ^ (s.e.)
Free flow time (FF) (min) −0.0273nnn (0.0033) 0.0318nnn (0.0028) 1.1107nnn (0.0981)
Slowed down time (SDT) (min) −0.0516nnn (0.0043) 0.0636nnn (0.0031) 1.4383nnn (0.0944)
Stop start time (SST) (min) −0.0559nnn (0.0039) 0.0603nnn (0.0031) 1.2067nnn (0.0686)
Running cost (RC) ($) −0.1766nnn (0.0194) 0.2432nnn (0.0313) 0.6272nnn (0.0417)
Toll cost (TC) ($) −0.3742nnn (0.0176) 0.3933nnn (0.0233) 0.8205nnn (0.0585)
mcd (in hypothetical alternatives only) 0.2918nnn (0.0254) 0.2550nnn (0.0282)
Constant
–Current alternative 0.9428nnn (0.0901) 0.8816nnn (0.0943)
–Route A −0.3179nnn (0.0825) −0.3432nnn (0.0841)
Age (years) 0.0060nnn (0.0018) 0.0062nnn (0.0018)
Income cost ($ ’000s) 0.0010nnn (0.0002) 0.0010nnn (0.00023)
Log-likelihood −9081.61 −9017.95
Information criterion: normalised AIC 1.511 1.501
No. of observations 12,032 12,032
Pseudo-R2 (relative to constants-only model) 0.0857 0.0921
Adj pseudo-R2 0.0849 0.0910
Standard errors in parentheses.
nnn Significance at the one per cent level.
Table 4.6
Estimation results embedding reference revision and MCD heuristics.
LPLA model NLWLR model
Model 5 Model 6
β^ (s.e.) β^ (s.e.) φ^ (s.e.)
Free flow time (FF) (min) −0.0313nnn (0.0035) 0.0358nnn (0.0032) 1.0501nnn (0.0992)
Slowed down time (SDT) (min) −0.0509nnn (0.0046) 0.0634nnn (0.0034) 1.3972nnn (0.1045)
Stop start time (SST) (min) −0.0555nnn (0.0041) 0.0600nnn (0.0034) 1.1671nnn (0.0756)
Running cost (RC) ($) −0.1895nnn (0.0207) 0.2944nnn (0.0356) 0.6145nnn (0.0400)
Toll cost (TC) ($) −0.4001nnn (0.0191) 0.4122nnn (0.0227) 0.9161nnn (0.0632)
mcd 0.3020nnn (0.0271) 0.2446nnn (0.0299)
refrev 2.2220nnn (0.0477) 2.2263nnn (0.0481)
Age (years) 0.0039nn (0.0019) 0.0041nn (0.0019)
Income cost ($ ’000s) 0.0010nnn (0.00026) 0.0011nnn (0.00025)
Constant
–Current alternative 1.7703nnn (0.0979) 1.6676nnn (0.1012)
–Route A −0.2349nnn (0.0870) −0.2579nnn (0.0881)
No. of choice observations 12,032 12,032
Log-likelihood −7883.00 −7817.74
Information criterion: normalised AIC 1.312 1.302
Pseudo-R2 (relative to constants-only model) 0.2064 0.2129
Adj pseudo-R2 0.2056 0.2119
Standard errors in parentheses.
nn Significance at the five per cent level.
nnn Significance at the one per cent level.
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If it is believed that there is heterogeneity in decision processes, i.e., different respondents using different heuristics, one
popular approach is to appeal to probabilistic decision process models (which are essentially latent class models) where the
functional form of the heuristic under consideration is expressed through the utility expressions in each class (Hensher and
Collins, 2011; Hess et al., 2012; McNair et al., 2012). Typically, each class represents one heuristic, which means that each
respondent is assumed to be relying only on one heuristic. However, what that heuristic (i.e., class membership) might be
for each individual can only be known up to a probability.
A suggested alternative to the latent class model approach is to weight each heuristic directly in the utility function.
Within the utility function, this approach allocates the proportional contribution of each heuristic to overall utility, with the
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relaxes the assumption used thus far of supposing an equal contribution of each heuristic to the utility function. In a model
with a total of M heuristics, the weights of each heuristic, denoted by Wm, m¼1, 2,…, M can be given by means of a logistic
function shown in the following equation:
Wm ¼
exp ∑lγlmZl
 
∑Mm ¼ 1exp ∑lγlmZl
  ð4:2Þ
In Eq. (4.2), Zl denotes the value of variable l which is typically a socioeconomic variable or a variable describing context
characteristics. γlm is a parameter weight that is allowed to vary according to each of the l variables and each of the m
heuristics. To ensure identification of the model, it will be necessary to normalise, for every variable l, one γlm.
As an illustration of this approach, we explore a ‘mixture’ of the LPLA standard fully compensatory decision rule and the
NLWLR heuristic. This example is very much in the spirit of Tversky and Simonson's (1993) componential contextual model,
where utility comprises a context independent effect (in this case LPLA) and a context dependent effect (in this case
NLWLR).
For this model, define the LPLA and NLWLR specifications as illustrated in the following equation:
H1 ¼ βH11 FFj þ βH12 SDTj þ βH13 SSTj þ βH14 RCj þ βH15 TCj and
H2 ¼ ðβH21 FFmax−βH21 FFjÞφ1 þ ðβH22 SDTmax−βH22 SDTjÞφ2 þ ðβH23 SSTmax−βH23 SSTjÞφ3
þðβH24 RCmax−βH24 RCjÞφ4 þ ðβH25 TCmax−βH25 TCjÞφ5 ð4:3Þ
Consequently, the utility functions for each of the three alternatives in the choice set can be written in the form of the
following equation:
UðcurrÞ ¼ β0;curr þW1H1 þW2H2 þ ε0
UðRoute AÞ ¼ β0;Route A þW1H1 þW2H2 þ ε1
UðRoute BÞ ¼W1H1 þW2H2 þ ε2 ð4:4Þ
We condition the heuristic weighting functionsW1 andW2 on the age and income cost variables that have been used in
previous estimations. In a two-heuristic model, W1 and W2 are given by the following equation:
W1 ¼
expðγH1age  ageþ γH1incomecost  income costÞ
expðγH1age  ageþ γH1incomecost  income costÞ þ expðγH2age  ageþ γH2incomecos t  income costÞ
W2 ¼
expðγH2age  ageþ γH2incomecost  income costÞ
expðγH1age  ageþ γH1incomecost  income costÞ þ expðγH2age  ageþ γH2incomecos t  income costÞ
ð4:5Þ
The restrictions γH2age ¼−γH1age and γH2incomecost ¼ −γH1incomecost were imposed for identification purposes.
In a model where γH1age and γ
H1
incomecost are assumed homogenous in the sample, the heuristic weights W1 and W2 will still
differ across respondents following the variations in the socioeconomic characteristics including the interaction of income
with cost. In particular, the income cost interaction allows the weights to vary across the hypothetical alternatives of
different choice sets even if they were answered by the same respondent. In effect, this interaction allows another avenue
for the choice context to determine preferences. Table 4.7 reports the results of the estimation for a fixed parameters model.
Parameters which are not statistically significant at the five per cent level are not estimated in the final model.
Model 7, which combines the LPLA and NLWLR rules, shows a substantial improvement in fit compared to either Model 1
or Model 2, which tests each decision rule singly. From the results of Model 7, it appears as if respondents are selectively
evaluating the SDT attribute only along the NLWLR heuristic, while the TC attribute appears only in the LPLA heuristic,
suggesting that the heuristic weights W1 and W2 do not apply equally to all attributes. More specifically, this finding raises
the interesting possibility that while the overall utility function is fully compensatory, individual heuristics may only be
semi-compensatory.
Turning to the heuristic weights, the partial derivatives of Wm with respect to each of its l arguments are functions that
take the same sign asγlm. Hence, the estimation results show thatW1, which is the weight of the LPLA heuristic, is increasing
in age and decreasing in income cost, with the opposite effect happening for W2, which represents the NLWLR heuristic.
These are interesting findings as they demonstrate a relationship between the use of a heuristic and the socioeconomic
characteristics of a respondent, and also with the choice context/choice set itself.
The distribution of W1 and W2 provides an indication of the strength of the context independent LPLA effect against the
reference dependent NLWLR heuristic. We proceed to use the estimated parameter estimates to construct W1 and W2, with
Fig. 4.1 illustrating the kernel density plots of W1 and W2. The means (standard deviation) of W1 and W2 are 0.538 (0.077)
and 0.462 (0.077) respectively. Under this particular two-heuristic model, the (semi-compensatory) LPLA heuristic is found
to take on a somewhat greater prominence in decision making compared to the NLWLR rule.
Table 4.7
Estimation of weighted LPLA and NLWLR decision rules in utility.
Model 7 β^ (s.e.) H1: LPLA H2:NLWLR
β^ (s.e.) β^ (s.e.) φ^ (s.e.)
Free flow time (FF) (min) −0.0449nnn (0.0121) 0.0226nn (0.0098) 0.8395nnn (0.2200)
Slowed down time (SDT) (min) 0.1304nnn (0.0096) 1.1919nnn (0.0745)
Stop start time (SST) (min) −0.0495nnn (0.0140) 0.0953nnn (0.0152) 1.0981nnn (0.0897)
Running cost (RC) ($) −0.5289nnn (0.0549) 0.3203nnn (0.0841) 0.4645nnn (0.0483)
Toll cost (TC) ($) −0.7767nnn (0.0495)
W1
γ^ (s.e.)
Income cost/1000 ($ ’000,000) −0.5072nnn (0.0412)
Age (years) 0.0048nnn (0.0014)
Constant
–Current alternative 0.7032nnn (0.0366)
–Route A −0.0841nn (0.0353)
LL −9000.93
Normalised AIC 1.499
No. of observations 12,032
Pseudo-R2 (relative to constants-only model) 0.0938
Adj pseudo-R2 0.0926
Standard errors in parentheses.
nn Significance at the five per cent level.
nnn Significance at the one per cent level.
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Inclusion of the reference revision heuristic into the utility expressions for the hypothetical alternatives introduces a
dummy variable indicating the type of alternative (current or hypothetical) chosen in the previous choice scenario. This
reference revision variable is linked to the unobserved effects of the previous choice set and potentially induces endogeneity
and correlation across choice sets for specific alternatives. Error components logit models are next estimated to address the
issue. At the same time, these models are allowed to account for the panel nature of the data. The error components model
is written in the following equation.
Ucurr ¼ β0;curr þ∑
k
βkXcurr;k þ βageageþ βincomecostincome costþ θcurrEcurr þ εcurr
URoute A ¼ β0;a þ∑
k
βkXa;k þ βageageþ βincomecostincome costþ θabEab þ εa
URoute B ¼∑
k
βkXb;k þ βincomecost income costþ θabEab þ εb
Ecurr ; Eabi:i:d:Nð0;1Þ ð4:6Þ
Two specifications are tested: one embedding refrev only and the other embedding both refrev and mcd. Results of the
estimation are shown in Table 4.8.
In Models 8 and 9, the parameter on the reference revision heuristic is estimated at a lower value of around 0.4,
compared to a value of around 2.2 in the MNL estimation of Model 5. This is a reduction of a factor of about five, with the
t-ratio lowered by a factor of about six. This might be expected as some of the choice set interdependence embodied in
reference revision is now picked up by the correlated error structure, so the reference revision effect identified earlier in
Model 5 is due in large part to what was then un-modelled similarity in preferences. However, there is still a significant
effect to refrev even after accounting for the panel nature of the data and for a possible correlation in error structure.
Additionally, Model 9 shows that the MCD heuristic remains significant in a panel error components logit model embedding
both the reference revision and MCD heuristics. Interestingly, the error component parameter θab in the hypothetical
alternatives turned insignificant on the addition of the MCD variable to the utility expressions, indicating that the error
component may itself be largely explained by the MCD heuristic. As suggestive as these findings are, there is certainly more
to be done in understanding how the significance of reference revision as a heuristic is impacted with alternative
specifications of the error component logit model.
4.6. Calculations of value of travel time savings (VTTS)
The marginal willingness-to-pay measure is a typical parameter of interest derived from choice models. This section
explores some of the implications on VTTS of embedding the previously identified heuristics into the model.
As there are several time and cost components modelled, the denominator of the VTTS expression will be some weighted
average of ∂Vj=∂RC and ∂Vj=∂TC, the marginal utilities for RC and TC, with Vj being the modelled component of the utility for
Kernel Density Estimates
1.67
3.34
5.01
6.68
8.34
.00
.20 .40 .61 .81 1.01.00
D
en
sit
y 
Density of W1 Density of W2
Fig. 4.1. Kernel density plot of W1 and W2.
Table 4.8
Results from the EC logit estimation.
Parameters LPLA model—embedding refrev only LPLA model—embedding refrev and mcd
Model 8 Model 9
β^ (s.e.) β^ (s.e.)
Free flow time (FF) (min) −0.0584nnn (0.0020) −0.0363nnn (0.0021)
Slowed down time (SDT) (min) −0.0952nnn (0.0041) −0.0628nnn (0.0043)
Stop start time (SST) (min) −0.1044nnn (0.0034) −0.0793nnn (0.0034)
Running cost (RC) ($) −0.4271nnn (0.0147) −0.2133nnn (0.0119)
Toll cost (TC) ($) −0.5010nnn (0.0153) −0.4602nnn (0.0154)
refrev 0.4201nnn (0.0614) 0.4072nnn (0.0618)
mcd – 0.3193nnn (0.0184)
Constant
–Current alternative 1.2882nnn (0.1413) 1.1523nnn (0.1457)
–Route A −0.1269 (0.0993) −0.1614 (0.0998)
Age (years) 0.0015 (0.0023) 0.0021 (0.0023)
Income cost 0.0013nnn (0.0002) 0.0013nnn (0.0002)
θcurr 0.9114nnn (0.2546) 2.5382nnn (.09714)
θab 2.2731nnn (0.1386) 0.0258 (0.5126)
Log-likelihood −6899.13 −6824.79
Information criterion: normalised AIC 1.149 1.137
No. of observations 12,032 12,032
Pseudo-R2 (relative to constants-only model) 0.3054 0.3129
Adj pseudo-R2 0.3047 0.3122
Simulation based on 150 Halton draws.
Estimation accounted for panel nature of data (number of choice sets per respondent¼16).
Standard errors in parentheses.
nnn Significance at the one per cent level.
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the form of the following equation:
WMUC¼ RC
RCþ TC
∂V
∂RC
þ TC
RCþ TC
∂V
∂TC
¼ RCβRC þ TCβRC
RCþ TC þ βincomecost  income ð4:7Þ
The VTTS for each time component can be obtained by means of the following equation
VTTSk ¼
∂V=∂Xk
WMUC
; where k∈ FF; SDT; SSTf g ð4:8Þ
Finally, the weighted average VTTS can be expressed, as shown in the equation
VTTS¼∑k∈fFF; SDT; SSTg
XkVTTSk
∑k′∈fFF; SDT; SSTgXk′
ð4:9Þ
Table 4.9
Summary of VTTS calculations.
Model type VTTS (A$/person-hour)
Mean Std deviation
LPLA 15.72 4.30
LPLA+mcd 16.59 8.03
LPLA+mcd+refrev 15.36 6.43
NLWLR 13.71 7.53
NLWLR+mcd 11.41 8.10
NLWLR+mcd+refrev 10.15 6.81
Error components logit: refrev only 13.03 2.44
Error components logit: refrev and mcd 18.11 9.08
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with respect to any single attribute Xk can be written as
∂V
∂Xk
¼−βkφkφkðXmax;k−XjkÞφk−1; k∈ FF; SDT; SSTf g
∂V
∂Xk
¼−βkφkφkðXmax;k−XjkÞφk−1 þ βincomecost  income; k∈ RC; TCf g ð4:10Þ
The weights in the WMUC and VTTS expressions are now given by gains in the levels of each attribute relative to the total
gains in the relevant component; for example, ∂Vj=∂RC is weighted by ðRCmax−RCjÞ=ððRCmax−RCjÞ þ ðTCmax−TCjÞÞ. As
φ^RC ; φ^TCo1, WMUC is negative infinity when at least one of the RC and TC attribute levels in alternative j is equal to the
RCmax or TCmax value in the choice set, i.e., when ðXmax;k−XjkÞ ¼ 0. The VTTS values are not calculated when this occurs.
The summary results of the VTTS calculations for the various models are reported in Table 4.9. The standard deviation
values in the LPLA models are obtained as a result of applying different weights to the βk parameters. The range of the
estimated VTTS is in the range of A$10 to A$18 per person-hour. From this dataset, there does not seem to be any discernible
trend as to how VTTS estimates behave when heuristics are accounted for explicitly in the model. Models including the
NLWLR heuristic tended to produce lower VTTS estimates, while the error components logit model including refrev andmcd,
which is the best model from the statistical perspective, produces the highest VTTS value.5. Conclusion
One of the objectives of this paper is to review the heuristics that have been identified in the various disciplines and test
the applicability of some of these heuristics to a dataset in the transport context. From this one dataset alone, we have found
that referencing and non-linearity appear to be important factors in understanding how choices are made. Where
referencing is concerned, the analyst may wish to appeal to reference points within choice sets (as in the case of worst level
referencing) and across choice sets (reference revision). Likewise, a non-linear specification of the utility function—be it
extremeness aversion or extremeness seeking—seems to better capture preferences compared to a linear specification.
Another simplifying heuristic—the majority of confirming dimensions—was also found to be a significant explanatory
variable in the utility functions for the hypothetical alternatives. Using a logit-type heuristic weighting function that
estimates the contribution of each heuristic to utility is also suggested as an alternative approach to latent class models,
with some promising results. The choice experiments in the dataset were not specifically designed to test any of these
heuristics and the empirical conclusions that have been reached might suggest that these heuristics are robust and may be
quite appropriate descriptions of respondent behaviour. Additionally, we are getting some indications that the same
heuristics are present in similar decision contexts involving toll roads. However, it seems that the door is still left open for
future research to more thoroughly examine the question of portability, i.e., whether the kinds of heuristics examined
herein are robust across datasets. Models may even be estimated on pooled data where it is feasible to do so.
The literature has observed that model outputs such as welfare estimates and willingness to pay can be substantially
different when the model departs from the standard assumptions about decision making. However, the jury is still out on
the direction of change to willingness to pay measures when heuristics are embedded into choice models. Some papers
suggest an increase in the value of VTTS when heuristics are modelled (e.g., Hensher (2010)), while others come to the
opposite conclusion (e.g., Cantillo and Ortuzar (2005)). Another fruitful area of further research is to attempt to uncover any
systematic explanations for how the VTTS is impacted when heuristics are embedded into the model.Acknowledgements
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